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I. INTRODUCTION 
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution guar-
antees freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.' The war-
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I. See U.S. CoNST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
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rant requirement and the probable cause requirement advance this 
constitutionally implied privacy right. 2 But with respect to auto-
mobile searches, strict adherence to these safeguards has been 
eschewed in favor of more flexible, and arguably less protective, 
versions of reasonableness. 3 
One such version, the "automobile exception" to the warrant 
requirement, was recognized by the Supreme Court in Carroll v. 
United States. 4 The automobile exception does not, however, dis-
pense with the requirement of probable cause. 5 Rather, it recognizes 
the inherent exigency of vehicle mobility and, more importantly, 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized . 
/d.; see also TEx. CoNST. art. I, § 9. Article I, section 9 maintains : 
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from 
all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to 
seize any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, 
nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation. 
/d. ; see also Duncan v. State, 680 S.W.2d 555, 558 (Tex. App .-Tyler l984, no pet.) (article 
I , section 9 of Texas constitution treated as coextensive with fourth amendment to U.S. 
Constitution) . 
2. See Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29, 87 S. Ct. 1727, 1730-31, 18 
L. Ed. 2d 930, 935 (1967) (governing principle of fourth amendment interpretation is that 
unless authorized by valid search warrant , search of private property absent proper consent 
is "unreasonable"). In Camara, the Court also noted that the fourth amendment's function , 
as is recognized in "countless decisions," is to secure a person's privacy against arbitrary 
governmental searches. See id. at 528, 87 S. Ct. at 1730, 18 L. Ed. 2d at 935; see also 
Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S . 250, 251, 11 S. Ct. 1000, 1001 , 35 L. Ed. 734, 737 
(1891) ("No right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded, by common law, than 
the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from all 
restraint or interference of others, unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law."). 
3. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S . 433 , 440, 93 S. Ct. 2523, 2527, 37 L. Ed. 2d 
706, 714 (1973) (branch of law dealing with automobile searches is "something less than a 
seamless web") ; see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48, 90 S. Ct. 1975 , 1979, 26 
L. Ed. 2d 419, 426 (1970) (regarding justification for warrantless search, Court has con-
sistently drawn distinction between home or office and automobile for fourth amendment 
purposes); Moylan, The Inventory Search of an Automobile: A Willing Suspension of 
Disbelief, 5 U. BALT. L. REv. 203 , 203 (1976) ("yawning credibility gap" resulting from 
inventory searches has significantly affected fourth amendment litigation); Comment, War-
rantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles and the Supreme Court from Carroll to 
Cardwell: Inconsistently Through the Seamless Web, 53 N.C.L. REv . 722, 722 (1975) (public's 
decreased privacy expectation in automobiles led to Supreme Court's inconsistent treatment 
of warrantless automobile searches and seizures). 
4. 267 U.S . 132, 45 S. Ct. 280, 69 L. Ed. 543 (1925) . 
5. See id. at 149, 45 S. Ct. at 283-84, 69 L. Ed. at 549 (warrantless search of 
automobile valid under fourth amendment if done pursuant to officer's belief that probable 
cause exists to search) . 
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the diminished expectation of privacy in a vehicle's contents as 
justification for proceeding without a warrant. 6 
Fifty years after Carroll, in South Dakota v. Opperman,? the 
Court approved an automobile inventory search conducted pursuant 
to standard police procedures as an administrative search alternative 
requiring neither probable cause nor a warrant. 8 The reasoning in 
Opperman was first adopted by the Texas Court of Criminal Ap-
peals in Robertson v. State. 9 In 1981, in Gill v. State, 10 the Texas 
court addressed the permissible scope of inventory searches, holding 
that the police may not search the locked trunk of an automobile 
while conducting an inventory search. 11 
Despite the simplicity of the Gill rule, 12 the court of criminal 
appeals, in the recent decisions of Kelley v. State, 13 Stephen v. 
6. See id. at 153, 45 S. Ct. at 285, 69 L. Ed . at 551 (warrant requirement dispensed 
with in light of automobile's inherent mobility, which creates valid exigent circumstance to 
search). 
7. 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1000 (1976). 
8. See id. at 372, 96 S. Ct. at 3098-99, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1007 (inventory searches 
conducted in accordance with standard police procedures are reasonable searches under 
fourth amendment guidelines). 
9. 541 S.W.2d 608, 610-11 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1109 (1977). 
The majority went on to conclude that, since the search of the defendant's car was conducted 
by the Houston police acting as caretakers and pursuant to standard police procedure, the 
search was not unreasonable under the fourth amendment. See id. at 611. Robertson has 
been criticized as unnecessarily broadening the power of the police to search an automobile 
absent any constitutional justifications. See Mills, Criminal Law and Procedure, 32 Sw. 
L.J. 461, 471 (1978) (Robertson authorized "thorough automobile search" under guise of 
inventory procedure after defendant's car had been taken into police custody); Perini, 
Criminal Law and Procedure, 31 Sw. L.J. 393, 410 (1977) (Robertson's reliance on Opperman 
appears to be erroneous since Robertson did not even consider inventory as search for 
fourth amendment purposes). 
10. 625 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (on motion for rehearing). The court of 
criminal appeals purported to overturn the rule of Gill v. State in its opinion in Osbon v. 
State, No. 368-83 (Tex. Crim. App . Sept. 17, 1986) (not yet reported). This decision is 
especially puzzling since the "rule" overturned had nothing to do with the prior holding in 
Gill relating to the permissible scope of vehicle inventory. Instead, the court focused on the 
holding in Gill on original submission that probable cause to believe one part of a vehicle 
contains contraband does not provide probable cause for searching other parts of the vehicle. 
See Osban v. State, No. 368-83 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 1986). The court in Osbon 
rejected any reading of its language in Gill suggesting that probable cause for search of the 
passenger compartment could never extend to the vehicle's trunk . See id. The Gill opinion 
orr motion for rehearing relating to the scope of an inventory was not discussed in Osbon 
and is treated in this article as not having been affected by the Osbon decision. 
11. See Gill, 625 S.W.2d at 319 (warrantless search of automobile trunk per se illegal 
absent showing of probable cause and exigent circumstances). 
12. See id. at 320 ("Under both of our constitutions, the forced entry into the locked 
trunk of the automobile constituted an unlawful intrusion."). 
13. 677 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 
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State, 14 and Guillett v. State, 15 condoned police intrusion into both 
locked trunks and a locked glove compartment pursuant to a vehicle 
inventory .16 While none of these 1984 cases expressly overruled Gill, 
taken as a whole they significantly expand the scope of inventory 
permitted by a fair reading of Gill. It is this expansion, and its 
relation to the doctrinal bases for inventory search, that will be 
explored in this article. 17 
II. INVENTORY SEARCHES AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT-FROM 
OPPERMAN TO BERTINE 
Almost all police departments in the United States have adopted 
a set of procedures authorizing a thorough inventory search of every 
car impounded by their officers, 18 and these searches are conducted 
without a warrant or probable cause. 19 As might be expected, 
14. 677 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. App . 1984). 
15 . 677 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 
16. See Kelley , 677 S.W.2d at 37 (police inventory search of locked car trunk was 
proper procedure); Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 44 (police properly conducted inventory of car's 
trunk); Guillett, 677 S.W.2d at 49 (search of locked glove compartment was lawful inventory 
search). 
17. The propriety of a vehicle's initial impoundment is an important factor in deter-
mining the overall legality of an inventory. See Reamey, Reevaluating the Vehicle Inventory, 
19 CRIM. L. BuLL. 325, 326 (1983) (even though impoundment of vehicle is important part 
of police function, validity of any inventory search depends on legality of car's initial 
impoundment). The Reamey article discusses situations in which cars are automatically 
impounded and calls for a fresh analysis of alternatives to vehicle impoundment. See id. at 
326-33 . 
18. See Texas Developments, Following Standard Police Procedures Requiring the 
Inventorying of Impounded Vehicle is Not Unreasonable Conduct Under the Fourth Amend-
ment, 5 AM. J . CRIM. L. 256, 256 (1977) [hereinafter Texas Developments] (in recent years, 
police departments have developed widespread practice of requiring that contents of im-
pounded vehicles be inventoried); Reamey, supra note 17, at 325 (inventory searches become 
"automatic and accepted method by which untold thousands of vehicles are thoroughly 
searched annually"); Comment, The Inventory Search of an Impounded Vehicle, 48 CHI. 
KENT L. REv. 48, 48 (1971) (nearly all police departments have specific procedures for their 
officers to search impounded vehicles as part of impounding process); Case Comment, 
Police Inventories of the Contents of Vehicles and the Exclusionary Rule, 29 WASH. & LEE 
L. REv. 197, 197 (1972) ("common practice" for police to inventory personal property 
contained in vehicles lawfully in police custody). During inventory searches, items discovered 
in the car are removed and listed. See Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Auto-
mobiles, 87 HARv. L. REv. 835, 848 (1974) (during inventory search, car's contents are 
thoroughly catalogued and any criminal evidence discovered is seized without warrant). 
19. See Reamey, supra note 17, at 325 (inventory searches require neither probable 
cause nor reasonable suspicion to believe that car contains evidence of crime) . The police 
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inventory searches quite frequently lead to the discovery of incrim-
inating evidence which is later used in the prosecution of the car's 
owner.20 The search for, and use of, criminal evidence without 
employing traditional constitutional safeguards has naturally re-
sulted in attacks on the underpinnings of this procedure. 21 
are also quick to justify this lack of probable cause or absence of a search warrant by 
arguing that the nature of the inventory search is innocuous. See Note, supra note 18, at 
849 (in inventory search, police support their intrusion by benign purpose, unlike investigative 
search to uncover criminal evidence); Comment, supra note 3, at 754 (purpose of inventory 
search is purportedly not to look for incriminating evidence but to inventory vehicle's 
contents) . Indeed, an inventory search may allow the police a wider latitude in the scope of 
their search . See United States v. Lawson, 487 F .2d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 1973) (police- are in 
better position when no reason to search because of permitted exploratory inventory search); 
Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 712, 484 P.2d 84, 92, 94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 420 
(1971) ("The inventory, by its nature, involves a random search of the articles left in an 
automobile taken into custody; the police are looking for nothing in particular and everything 
in general.") . Numerous other exceptions to the fourth amendment warrant requirement 
exist. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L. Ed. 2d 486, 
498 (1978) (urgent need to preserve life or avoid injury); Schnek1oth v. Bustamante, 412 
U.S. 218, 248, 93 S. Ct. 2041, 2058-59, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 875 (1973) (owner consents); 
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465-66, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2037-38, 29 L. Ed. 2d 
564, 582-83 (1971) (evidence in plain view); Chime! v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 
S. Ct. 2034, 2039-40, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 693-94 (1969) (area within defendant's control and 
defendant may reach weapons or destructible evidence); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24-25, 
88 S. Ct. 1868, 1881-82, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 907-08 (1968) (limited search of person, based 
on reasonable suspicion, to detect weapons); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298-99, 87 
S. Ct. 1642, 1645-46, 18 L. Ed. 2d 782, 787 (1967) (when police pursuing felon). 
20. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 412 F.2d 729, 730 (5th Cir. 1969); see also 
Note, Automobile Inventory Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment Expanded by State 
v. Williams, 13 N.M.L. REv . 689, 694 (1983) (police frequently find incriminating evidence 
as result of inventory searches and use it against defendant at trial on original offense or 
at trial resulting from prosecution due to incriminating evidence). Quite often, this incrim-
inating evidence is obtained by an inventory search of a locked automobile trunk. See United 
States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 469 (8th Cir. 1973); Duncan v. State, 680 S.W.2d 555, 
556-57 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no pet.); Williams v. State, 644 S.W.2d 751, 752 (Tex. 
App.-Beaumont 1982, no pet.) . 
21. See Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 705-06, 484 P .2d 84, 88, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 412, 416 (routine inventory procedure is undeniably a substantial invasion into car 
owner's privacy rights). "Regardless of the professed benevolent purposes and euphemistic 
explication, an inventory search involves a thorough exploration by the police into the 
private property of an individual." Id. at 706, 484 P.2d at 88, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416. A 
pervasive concern has been that the inventory search will be used to justify an intrusion 
which would otherwise be prohibited due to the inability to obtain a warrant for the search. 
See Reamey, supra note 17, at 334; see also Comment, supra note 19, at 724-25 (warrantless 
inventory searches raise important fourth amendment issues); Comment, supra note 18, at 
48 (evidence which would not be admissible, even in situations where obtained during search 
pursuant to search warrant, is now admissible when gained by arguably exploratory search). 
Any review of the legality of inventory searches must start with an analysis of the different 
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The real genesis of the vehicle inventory on a national scale 
occurred in 1976 when the Supreme Court, in South Dakota v. 
Opperman, first specifically recognized the constitutionality of in-
ventory as a feature of the police caretaking function. 22 Opperman's 
car had been towed and impounded for multiple parking violations, 23 
a frequent cause for impoundment. 24 An inventory search of the 
car's contents, including the contents of the unlocked glove com-
partment, was prompted by police observing personal effects in 
plain view in the car's interior. 25 Justice Burger, writing the plurality 
opinion, concluded that the inventory, conducted in accordance 
with standard police procedures, was reasonable under the fourth 
amendment as a response to three distinct governmental interests: 
(1) protection of the car owner's property while in police custody; 
(2) protection of the police from claims concerning lost or stolen 
property; and (3) protection of the police from potential danger. 26 
It is important to recognize, as Justice Powell did in his 
concurring opinion, that inventory searches do indeed intrude into 
an area in which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 27 
interests implicated . See Note, supra note 20, at 689 (determining constitutionality of 
inventory searches requires examination of alleged administrative justifications for intrusion 
and balancing of intrusion against individual's right to privacy). The validity and constitu-
tionality of the police practice of conducting inventory searches of impounded vehicles has 
become an "increasingly complex and recurring issue." See id. Over time, courts have 
grappled with the task of classifying these procedures for fourth amendment purposes . 
Compare Kaufman v. United States, 453 F.2d 798, 801-02 (8th Cir. 1971) (recovery of gun 
frpm car's back seat not result of search in legal sense) and Fagundes v. United States, 340 
F.2d 673, 676 (1st Cir. 1965) (intrusion of car not search in legal sense) with People v. 
Sullivan, 29 N.Y.2d 69, 77, 272 N.E.2d 464, 469, 323 N.Y.S.2d 945, 952 (1971) (inventory 
search reasonable under fourth amendment) and Gagnon v. State, 212 So. 2d 337, 338-39 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (police discovery of credit cards result of reasonable search). 
Inventories differ from searches in that inventories allegedly safeguard property while 
searches seek incriminating evidence; inventories are presumably a more limited intrusion . 
See Texas Developments, supra note 18, at 261. 
22. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 365, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3095, 49 L. Ed. 
2d 1000, 1003 (1976) . 
23 . /d. at 365-66, 96 S. Ct. at 3095, 49 L. Ed . 2d at 1003-04. 
24. See id. at 368, 96 S. Ct. at 3097, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1005 (police frequently remove 
and impound cars that violate parking ordinances). 
25. Id. at 366, 96 S. Ct. at 3095,-49 L. Ed. 2d at 1003 . 
26. See id. at 369, 96 S. Ct. at 3097, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1005 . The Court also noted that 
it was " beyond challenge" that the police have the authority to impound vehicles if they 
disrupt the flow of traffic or threaten public safety. See id. 
27. See id. at 377 n.l, 96 S. Ct. at 3101 n.l , 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1010 n.l (Powell, J ., 
concurring) ("Routine inventories of automobiles intrude upon an area in which the private 
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This privacy interest, diminished as it is by the nature of the vehicle, 
may be outweighed by the governmental interests advanced to justify 
the inventory procedure. 28 But the privacy interest is certainly not 
less significant per se; the government bears the burden of estab-
lishing in each case that its interests are greater. 29 
Balancing interests is, by definition, the very sort of ad hoc 
analysis of competing interests reflected in Opperman. Even assum-
ing that the identified governmental interests remain static, the 
dynamics embodied in reasonable expectation of privacy will neces-
sitate an independent analysis of the weight to be accorded privacy 
rights in each instance. 
Until the United States Supreme Court decided Colorado v. 
Bertine3° in January of 1987, there was no reason to believe that 
this balancing of privacy rights against governmental needs could 
not or should not be undertaken by those administering the care-
taking function. But in Bertine, the Court abandoned field deter-
minations of privacy expectations by police officers in favor of a 
"bright-line" rule that inventory of the contents of closed con-
tainers-even of luggage-:-within a vehicle's passenger compartment 
satisfies the reasonableness requirement of the fourth amendment. 31 
Bertine did not, however, altogether dispense with balancing to 
determine whether a particular search procedure is reasonable. To 
citizen has a 'reasonable expectation of privacy.' "). While the Supreme Court has rejected 
the argument that police officers must determine and weigh the owner's reasonable expec-
tation of privacy prior" to conducting an inventory of containers found within an automobile ' s 
interior, it has not, at least not yet, held that balancing privacy rights to assess the 
reasonableness of an inventory is no longer required of a reviewing court. See Colorado v. 
Bertine, __ u.s. __ , __ , 107 S. Ct. 738, 742-43, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739, 747-48 (1987) . 
28 . See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 377-78, 96 S. Ct. at 3101 , 49 L. Ed . 2d at 1010 (Powell, 
J ., concurring) (whether fourth amendment allows routine inventory searches is determined 
by balancing of interests). 
29. Cj. id. at 379-80, 96 S. Ct. at 3102, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1011 (Powell, J., concurring) 
(despite reduced expectation of privacy in automobile, to allow police to conduct unrestrained 
search of automobile would result in serious intrusion upon car owner's privacy). Justice 
Powell also noted that when the police removed the items in plain view, rolled up the 
windows, and locked the car doors, they had satisfied any duty of protection they owed the 
car owner. /d. at 378 n.3, 96 S. Ct. at 3102 n.3, 49 L. Ed . 2d at 1011 n.3 (Powell, J ., 
concurring) . The justice concluded by emphasizing that one of the main reasons supporting 
the validity of inventories is that the police have "no significant discretion" concerning the 
permissible scope of their search. Id. at 384, 96 S. Ct. at 3104-05, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1014 
(Powell , J., concurring) . 
30. __ U.S. __ , 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987). 
31. See id. at--· 107 S. Ct. at 743 , 93 L. Ed. 2d at 748. 
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the contrary, the Court relied heavily upon its decision in Illinois 
v. Lajayette,32 noting that the balancing done in that case justified 
the inventory of personal effects of an arrestee being jailed. 33 
Apparently, the Court has preserved balancing of interests generally, 
and determining reasonable expectation of privacy specifically, as 
the exclusive domain of courts reviewing inventory searches.J4 In 
this case, the privacy interest of Steven Bertine in the contents of 
containers within his backpack was found insufficient to outweigh 
the needs of the government; therefore, the search was reasonable. 35 
The Supreme Court's "bright-line" approach to balancing has 
seemingly settled, for the time being, the question of whether 
unlocked containers within the passenger compartment of an im-
pounded vehicle fall within the permissible scope of an automobile 
inventory search. They do.36 It remains to be seen whether the 
32. 462 U.S. 640, 103 S. Ct. 2605 , 77 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1983). 
33 . See Bertine, __ U.S. at __ , 107 S. Ct. at 742, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 746. Describing 
the decision in Lafayette, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted, "In deciding whether this search 
was reasonable, we recognized that the search served legitimate governmental interests similar 
to those identified in Opperman. We determined that those interests outweighed the indi-
vidual's Fourth Amendment interests and upheld the search. " Id. (emphasis added). 
34. The only obvious alternative to this reading of the Bertine opinion is that, at least 
in vehicle inventory cases, invasion of containers within the passenger compartment, and 
perhaps the entire vehicle, is per se reasonable, the balancing having been done once and 
for all and the Court having decided that an expectation of privacy could, as a matter of 
law, never outweigh the governmental interests served by inventory. To accept this interpre-
tation of the Court's decision would require simultaneously dispensing with considerable 
precedent recognizing the varying levels of privacy expectation in containers of differing 
types and elevating the governmental interests recognized in Opperman to a new and illogical 
importance. 
35. See Bertine, __ U.S. at __ , 107 S. Ct. at 742, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 746-47 . The 
Colorado Supreme Court, relying on Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S . 753, 99 S. Ct. 2586, 
61 L. Ed. 2d 235 (1979) and United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S . 1, 97 S. Ct. 2476, 53 L. 
Ed. 2d 538 (1977), had interpreted fourth amendment privacy interests to be greater in 
personal luggage than in an automobile. People v. Bertine, 706 P.2d 411 , 414-15 (Colo. 
1985), rev'd, Colorado v. Bertine, __ U.S. __ , 107 S. Ct. 738 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987). 
Balancing this heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of the backpack against the 
governmental interests recognized in Opperman, the Colorado court concluded that "the 
defendant's privacy interests in the cans outweighed the government's need to inventory 
their contents." See id. at 418 . 
36. If Opperman is read as holding that inventory may properly extend to unlocked 
glove compartments, Bertine would seem only a slight expansion in permitting the search 
of an unlocked container found within the passenger compartment. This interpretation, 
however, overlooks the significance of the backpack as a repository for personal effects, a 
characteristic of great significance to the Colorado Supreme Court and the dissenting justices 
in Bertine. See People v. Bertine, 706 P .2d at 414-15 , 418; Colorado v. Bertine, __ U.S. 
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fourth amendment's reasonableness requirement will be satisfied as 
easily when the inventory extends to locked containers within the 
passenger compartment or to a locked trunk compartment. 37 
Ill. THE SCOPE OF VEHICLE INVENTORY SEARCHES IN TEXAS 
A. Gill v. State 
The permissible scope of inventory searches in Texas was first 
meaningfully addressed by the court of criminal appeals in Gill v. 
State, nearly six years before the Supreme Court's decision in 
Bertine. 38 In Gil/, a Houston police officer pulled up next to the 
at __ , 107 S. Ct. at 749, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The Colorado 
Supreme Court noted in its opinion: "Most significantly, the search here involved an 
intrusion into a container intended as a repository of personal effects. Unlike the unlocked 
glove compartment in Opperman, containers such as backpacks do not carry a diminished 
expectation of privacy." 706 P.2d at 418. Similarly, Justice Marshall, dissenting from the 
decision in Bertine, pointed out that "the Court completely ignores respondent's expectation 
of privacy in his backpack. Whatever his expectation of privacy in his automobile generally, 
our prior decisions clearly establish that he retained a reasonable expectation of privacy in 
the backpack and its contents." __ U.S . at __ , 107 S. Ct. at 749, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 755 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) . 
37. There is reason to believe the Bertine opinion has laid the groundwork for this 
extension. In absolving the police of any responsibility for initially balancing competing 
interests, the Court quoted With approval its opinion in United States v. Ross: 
When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have 
been precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, 
in the case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, 
and wrapped packages, in the case of [a] vehicle, must give way to the interest in 
the prompt and efficient completion of the task at hand. 
Bertine, __ U.S. at __ , 107 S. Ct. at 743, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 747-48 (quoting United 
States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 821-22, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2171, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 591 (1982)) . 
If the Court intends that "nice distinctions" will not apply to the scope of inventory 
searches in the future, it effectively will be permitting a search of the same scope as that 
allowed when probable cause exists. This prospect is placed in better perspective by recog-
nizing that the "automobile exception" search described in Ross is for the purpose of 
finding criminal evidence or contraband, not for the relatively insignificant governmental 
purposes nominally advanced by inventory . Indeed, without the "nice distinctions," the 
scope of inventory searches would not be coextensive with that of searches conducted 
pursuant to probable cause; they would exceed probable cause searches in scope because 
they would not be limited to places in which the evidence or contraband could be found. 
Rather, the scope would be the equivalent of that permitted by a general warrant. 
38. See Gill v. State, 625 S.W.2d 307, 309 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980) (on motion for 
rehearing) (appeal concerned propriety of intrusion by police into locked trunk subsequent 
to discovering contraband in car's interior), overruled on other grounds by Osban v. State, 
No. 368-83 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 1986) (not yet reported). 
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defendant's car in a parking lot outside of a convenience store.39 
After briefly conversing with the defendant,40 the officer asked him 
to produce identification. 41 When the defendant presented an altered 
driver's license,42 the police officer arrested him.43 After thoroughly 
searching the interior of the defendant's car, 44 the police officer 
asked for, and was denied, the key to the car's trunk. 45 Later, with 
the aid of a wrecker driver, the officer removed the back seat of 
the car and discovered hydromorphone tablets in the trunk. 46 
Justice Teague, in an opinion denouncing the police search of 
the trunk,47 began by emphasizing that a proper inventory consists 
of simply listing the items of personal property found in plain view 
within the automobile. 48 Because the intrusion is limited in this 
way, 49 inventories, unlike other "pure" searches under the fourth 
amendment, are not predicated upon either probable cause or the 
existence of a warrant. 50 However, where the scope of the search 
~9 . I d . a\. ~ n. I._C.\l.""t.<>""· 1 .• <:.<>w;:urnw@,) . 
40. /d. at 313 (Clinton, J., concurring). Officer Lawrence admitted he was stalling for 
time when he talked to defendant about directions to the Astrodome. /d. 
41. /d. at 313 (Clinton, J ., concurring) . Justice Clinton also gives a detailed analysis 
ot ~•<o"'"' ". \:=a~. <!A"?. U .'&. 6,1, 99 '&. C.\ . 1.t."?.1, t.\ \... r.~. 1.~ 1'S1 \_\'~19) , an~ conc\uO.es 
that, under Brown, the defendant had not been seized for fourth amendment purposes when 
the officer asked for identification and the defendant complied. See id. at 313 n.3 (Clinton, 
J., concurring). 
42. 625 S.W.2d at 314-15 (Clinton, J., concurring). 
43. See id. at 315 (Clinton, J., concurring) (display of altered license and driving 
without valid license were offenses under TEx. CoDE CRIM. PRoc. ANN . art. 14.01(b) 
(Vernon 1977). 
44. See id. (Clinton, J., concurring) (a search pursuant to Chime! v. California, 395 
U.S. 752, 762-63, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685, 694 (1969), which authorized 
officer to conduct search, or protective sweep, in areas of defendant's immediate control, 
yielded no contraband other than single marijuana cigarette). 
45. /d. at 316 (Douglas, J ., dissenting). 
46. /d. (Douglas, J ., dissenting). The defendant was given a five year prison sentence 
and five thousand dollar fine for possession of hydromorphone. See id. at 309. 
47. Id. at 317. 
48 . See id. at 319 (by using standard inventory form, police officer "lawfully inventories 
the contents of a lawfully impounded motor vehicle"). Justice Teague was quick to note 
the unique nature of the automobile inventory search. See id. (true automobile inventory 
search does not take place within confines of probable cause and search incident to lawful 
arrest) . 
49. See id. at 316 ("A true inventory search of an automobile . . . is just that and 
nothing more") (emphasis added) . Justice Teague also made a point that the police may 
not search the locked trunk of an impounded automobile. See id. He expressly avoided the 
issue of the "fine legal distinctions" between searching opened or unopened containers 
discovered within an automobile. /d. 
50. /d. 
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exceeds these limits, it is necessarily cloaked with fourth amendment 
safeguards. In Gill, the court concluded that absent a showing of 
probable cause and exigent circumstances, the warrantless search of 
a locked trunk is "per se illegal," apparently because conducting 
an inventory of the trunk was considered per se excessive.51 
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Teague also noted that the 
State, in attempting to justify its actions as an inventory, overlooked 
two important facts bearing on the expectation of privacy in, and 
the security of, personal items placed in a locked car trunkY First, 
items placed in a trunk are not in the plain view of passersby or 
would-be thieves, as are items in a car's interior. 53 Second, the 
security afforded by a locked trunk makes it much less likely that 
it will be forcibly entered. 54 Because of that greater security, the 
court observed, the possibility of subsequent claims against the 
police for lost or stolen property is greatly reduced,55 as is the 
possibility of theft or vandalism of the trunk's contents. 56 
This heightened expectation of privacy in the contents of a car 
trunk is not, therefore, overcome by the purportedly benevolent 
purposes of an inventory search, 57 and would, in fact, be outweighed 
only when the police could demonstrate probable cause justifying 
a search of the trunk. 58 To hold otherwise, Justice Teague con-
cluded, would do nothing less than condone the full search of an 
automobile every time the owner was lawfully arrested.59 
51. /d. 
52. See id. 
53 . See id. ("opaque nature" of trunk completely hides items within trunk from external 
view). 
54. See id. (automobile trunk requires breaking or removing of lock to gain entry into 
trunk's interior, while merely breaking window affords easy access to personal items in car's 
interior) . Justice Teague pointed out that the need to remove a car' s back seat, as in the 
instant case, also demonstrated the increased security within a locked car trunk . /d. 
55 . See id. (if locked trunk can be entered only by excessive force, unlikely that 
subsequent claims concerning lost or stolen property will arise). 
56. /d. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. (expectation of privacy in locked trunk could be outweighed where police 
have "reasonable expectation to believe," or "probable cause" to demonstrate, that car's 
trunk contains dangerous instrumentality) . Justice Teague emphasized that the force required 
to enter the trunk showed that the purported justifications of the inventory search were not 
substantial enough to overcome the owner's heightened expectation of privacy in the contents 
of the locked trunk. /d. at 319-20. Probable cause may be developed from the contents of 
the passenger compartment. See Osban v. State, No. 368-83 (Tex . Crim. App. Sept. 17, 
1986) (not yet reported) . 
59 . See 625 S.W.2d at 320 (State advocates that lawful, routine arrest of suspect in 
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B. Kelley v. State, Stephen v. State, Guillett v. State 
On September 19, 1984, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals 
issued opinions in the cases of Kelley v. State,60 Stephen v. State, 61 
and Guillett v. State,62 which substantially expanded the scope of 
vehicle inventory. In Kelley and Stephen, the defendants were ini-
tially stopped by the police for erratic driving. 63 After each defend-
ant was arrested, his car was subjected to a thorough inventory.64 
In each case, the police obtained the keys to the trunk of the car 
without the owner's consent, opened and searched the trunk, and 
found incriminating evidence.65 
In distinguishing these two cases from Gill, Justice McCormick 
emphasized the fact that in Kelley and Stephen there was no forced 
entry into the trunk. 66 He reasoned that since the police in Gill 
could not open the trunk, they were effectively free from any 
subsequent claims for lost or stolen property. 67 Since, however, the 
police in Kelley and Stephen had keys to the car's trunk, they were 
exposed to potential liability from claims of loss or theft, a concern 
evidently sufficient to justify inventory of the secured trunk. 68 
The dissenting opinions in both Kelley and Stephen asserted 
that Gill had been effectively overruled by the court's holdings. 69 
Justice Miller, in his dissenting opinion to Kelley, noted that the 
automobile authorizes search of "virtually every nook and cranny of that autombile") . 
Justice Teague summarily dispensed with this argument by noting that it had no legal basis 
in either the Texas or United States constitution or in any court of criminal appeals' 
interpretation of these documents . /d. 
60. 677 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Crim. App . 1984). 
61. 677 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 
62. 677 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 
63. See Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 37 (defendant's car seen weaving across center line of 
roadway); Stephen, 677 S. W .2d at 43 (defendant's car observed making abrupt left turn 
without signaling). 
64. Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 37; Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 43. 
65. See Kelley, 677 S. W.2d at 37 (appellant gave officer keys to the trunk); Stephen, 
677 S.W.2d at 43 (arresting officer took the keys from the ignition to open the trunk). 
66. Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 37; Stephen , 677 S.W.2d at 44. 
67 . See Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 37 (police in Gill " would have been free from any claims 
of tampering" with defendant's property); Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 44. 
68. See Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 37; Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 44 (in both cases, inventory 
search of locked trunk was means of protecting police from subsequent claims for theft) . 
69. Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 39 (Miller, J., dissenting) ("For my part, I cannot condone 
the majority's holdng and certainly cannot reconcile it with Gill"); Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 
46 (Teague, J ., dissenting) ("majority opinion implicitly overrules" Gill's principles of law) . 
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majority's opinion was not supported by Opperman,10 and that it 
effectively authorized an unlimited search of every car once the 
owner was arrested, the same concern previously used to support 
the holding in Gi/1. 71 Justice Teague, dissenting to. Stephen, con-
cluded that the majority had effectively condoned a search of a 
constitutionally-protected area without either probable cause or a 
search warrant. 72 
In Guil/ett v. State, the defendant was arrested for public 
intoxication. 73 After the police placed the defendant in the patrol 
car, they conducted an inventory of his car. 74 One of the officers 
obtained the defendant's keys and unlocked the glove compartment 
where he discovered methaqualone. 75 The defendant was subse-
quently prosecuted for possession of a controlled substance. 76 
Justice Campbell, in an opinion upholding the police inventory 
search of the locked glove compartment,77 noted the "paramount" 
fact that in this case the police had the defendant's keys, whereas 
in Gill, the defendant declined to give his keys to the police. 78 The 
facts in Guil/ett were found indistinguishable from the facts in 
Opperman, a similarity used to justify the conclusion that the 
inventory was reasonable. 79 Justice Campbell saw no difference in 
the fact that in Opperman the car was locked and the glove 
compartment was unlocked, while in Guillett, the car was unlocked 
and the glove compartment was locked. 80 
70. Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 40 (Miller, J., dissenting). 
71. !d. at 41 (Miller, J ., dissenting) (majority embraces the court's view of the State's 
argument in Gill, authorizing search of "every nook and cranny" of car once driver arrested, 
and "cloaks it in the imprimatur of law"). Justice Miller wondered if the majority was not 
actually helping the police fight crime "regardless of the concepts of individual liberty 
involved." ld.; see Gill v. State, 625 S.W.2d 307, 320 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (on motion 
for rehearing), overruled on other grounds by Osban v. State, No. 368-83 (Tex . Crim. App. 
Sept. 17, 1986) (not yet reported). 
72. Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 46 (Teague, J., dissenting). 
73. Guillett, 677 S.W.2d at 48. 
74. ld. 
75 . ld. The opinion does not state how or from where police obtained keys . 
76. I d. at 47. 
77 . ld. at 49. 
78 . Id. at 48 . 
79. Id. at 49. The Opperman facts are set out but not actually compared to those in 
Guillett . See id. For a discussion of Opperman, see supra notes 22-29 and accompanying 
text. 
80. See 677 S.W.2d at 49 ("We do not find this difference to be of any great 
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IV. THE RELATION OF GOVERNMENTAL INTERESTS AND SCOPE 
ANALYSIS 
The holdings in Gill and the three more recent cases were 
based, at least in part, on the Supreme Court's decision in Opper-
man ,81 an interpretation of fourth amendment limits that has sub-
sequently been reaffirmed by Colorado v. Bertine.82 Before Bertine, 
commentators and courts discussed, often critically, the soundness 
of Opperman and its progeny.83 Some critics pointed to the Court's 
general deference to "standard police procedure" as a validation 
of inventory searches . 84 Other critics voiced concern that the police, 
significance .' ' ) . 
Justice Teague again expressed frustration with the majority's new rule that once the 
police have probable cause to arrest the car's driver , they are justified in conducting a 
thorough warrantless search of the entire car, including the locked glove compartment. I d . 
at 49-50 (Teague, J., dissenting) . He concluded that the majority had completely failed to 
understand Gill's reasoning and holding. Id. at 50. As a result of this misinterpretation, 
Justice Teague cautioned, the right of Texas citizens to be free from unreasonable searches 
and seizures had been dealt a crippling blow. Id. at 50-5!. 
81. See Guillett, 677 S.W.2d at 49 (facts of instant case held similar to facts of 
Opperman; holding in Opperman applicable to instant case); Stephen , 677 S.W.2d at 44 
(court cites Gill to justify inventory search in instant case and court in Gill refers extensively 
to Opperman in reaching its decision); Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 37 (majority cites Opperman 
for principle that inventory searches conducted pursuant to standard police procedures are 
constitutional); Gill, 625 S.W.2d at 317-18 (majority refers to Opperman at length in 
discussion of validity of inventory search of locked trunk). 
82. __ U.S. __ , 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed. 2d 739 (1987) . 
83 . See Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 712, 484 P.2d 84, 92, 94 Cal. Rptr. 
412, 420 (1971) (Burke, J ., concurring) (protection of owner ' s property and protection of 
police from fraudulent claims do not justify police rummaging through closed containers 
and sealed packages); see also Reamey, supra note 17, at 325 (one must wonder why 
thorough rethinking of rationale for inventory searches has not occurred). The Reamey 
article also notes that those decisions which have implicitly limited Opperman have done so 
by focusing on the propriety of the car ' s impoundment and the permissible scope of the 
inventory search itself. Id. at 326; see also Comment, supra note 18, at 48 (even though 
courts justify inventory searches as routine police procedure, the constitution does not allow 
otherwise unreasonable search to become reasonable based on frequency of intrusion); Note, 
supra note 18, at 853 (requirement that warrantless searches be justified only by special 
circumstances would align procedure of inventory searches " with the general corpus of 
fourth amendment law"). 
84. See Backer v. State, 656 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Tex. Crim. App . 1983) (Clinton, J., 
dissenting) (standard police procedure justification has led to " a hodgepodge of local 
idiosyncrasy"); see also Texas Developments, supra note 18, at 260 (court has created duty 
on other police departments to begin inventory searches but reasoning is circular: court 
creates duty to inventory and then holds that because duty exists, resulting inventory is not 
unreasonable); Note, supra note 18, at 852 (any inquiry into intent of police officer regarding 
true purpose behind inventory search is clouded if police have standard procedure of 
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in securing the car owner's property, rarely consult the car's owner 
for alternatives to the impoundment and inventory procedure. 85 The 
main criticism of Opperman, however, has been directed at the 
soundness of relying upon the three governmental interests articu-
lated by the Court in assessing whether an inventory is reasonable 
at its inception.86 Much of this criticism applies with equal force to 
the Bertine decision. 
A. Protection of the Car Owner's Property 
If the police are seriously concerned about protecting a car 
owner's · property, their goal would be better achieved by at least 
consulting with the car's owner before inventorying the vehicle's 
contents. 87 Often, an owner would prefer to assume the risk of theft 
inventorying all vehicles coming into police custody); Note, supra note 20, at 702 (validity 
of inventory search is determined by its reasonableness in light of fourth amendment 
principles, not by what police determine to be reasonable procedures). 
85 . See Jones v. State, 345 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App . 1977) (since car owner 's 
friends were available to remove car, police had no need to conduct inventory search); 
Comment, supra note 3, at 762 (inventories should be allowed without warrant only if police 
have some reason to believe that securable property is located in car and car 's owner cannot 
be found, or is so incapacitated, that he is unable to secure safety and privacy of his car 
and its contents) . Even if the car does contain property, most of the time the police know 
where to locate the owner, who can usually do whatever he desires to protect his own 
property. Id. at 761. But see Wallis v. State, 636 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, no 
pet.) (unreasonable to require police officer to seek alternatives regarding impoundment of 
defendant's vehicle). 
86. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S . 364, 389, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 3107, 49 L. Ed . 
2d 1000, 1017 (1976) (Marshall, J ., dissenting) (none of reasons given to permit inventory 
searches, taken separately or together, can justify automobile inventory procedures); 2 W. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 7.4, at 565 n.16 
(1978) (some doubt as to validity of government interest that inventory searches protect 
police from potential danger since "if the police are endangered by unsearched cars in their 
possession, then it would seem that the public is endangered by cars parked on the streets"); 
Reamey, supra note 17, at 338 (obvious that protection of property justification is actually 
secondary concern behind permitting police to conduct searches); Case Comment, supra 
note 18, at 203-04 (if vehicle is stored free of charge, police are gratuitous bailees, and as 
such, owe duty to car owner not to be grossly negligent). In this case, simply locking the 
car door would seem to satisfy the police duty of care. See id. 
87. See Colorado v. Bertine, __ U.S. __ , __ , 107 S. Ct. 738, 748 , 93 L. Ed. 2d 
739, 754 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 
1161 , 1165 (8th Cir. 1980) (since owner of car was present during inventory search, police 
had other ways to protect their interest besides intruding into privacy of locked automobile 
trunk); Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 707, 484 P .2d 84, 89, 94 Cal. Rptr . 412, 
417 (1971) (if police insist on denying car owner opportunity to personally suggest how he 
wants his car's contents secured, then it is unreasonable to believe that inventory of items 
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or loss rather than give up his privacy interest in the vehicle, 
especially if the vehicle can be secured in some other way. 88 More-
over, because expectation of privacy is a fluid concept, it is con-
stitutionally unrealistic to treat the invasion of every automobile 
compartment or container in the same fashion. Even assuming a 
car owner need not be offered alternatives for protection of his 
belongings left in plain view within the passenger compartment, 
offering such alternatives might be necessary in light of the vastly 
different interests involved when items are secured and hidden from 
view. 
Also, since the inventory search is often a significant intrusion 
upon the owner's reasonable expectation of privacy,89 the balancing 
undertaken in Opperman dictates that if the search is to be consti-
tutional, its utility must be substantial enough to outweigh any 
privacy rights that a car owner has in his personal property. 90 
not within plain view is for owner's benefit); Miller v. State, 403 So. 2d 1307, 1313 (Fla. 
1981) (if main justification for inventory search is protection of car and its contents, it 
follows that if owner is available, he should be consulted concerning impoundment of car); 
Jones v. State, 345 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App . 1977) (after arresting car owner 
for driver's license violation, police conducted inventory search of entire car, including 
locked trunk, even though car owner requested that police allow his friends to drive car 
from scene). 
88. In Bertine, for example, the defendant's car was stored in a "lighted, private storage 
lot with a locked 6-foot fence" that was patrolled by police and security guards. Nothing 
had ever been stolen from there. __ U.S. at __ n.6, 107 S. Ct. at 747 n.6, 93 L. Ed. 
2d at 752 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Reamey, supra note 17, at 337 (most car 
owners would undoubtedly assume "de minimus risk" inherent in leaving articles in unse-
cured car rather than subject contents of their cars to intrusive search conducted pursuant 
to standard inventory procedure). Indeed, if a car contains items requiring special care, it 
is logical to assume the owner would ask the police to retrieve the items and return them 
to his custody. Id. at 335 . Moreover, "property loss is an insurable harm, whereas a 
violation of privacy is not." Note, supra note 18, at 853. If, however, a car owner consents 
to a police search of his car, the question of protecting the car owner's property is irrelevant 
in determining the validity of the inventory search. See United States v. Hall, 565 F.2d 917, 
922 (5th Cir. 1978); State v. Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1, __ , 397 A.2d 1050, 1051 (1979) 
(routine inventory procedures following impoundment are unconstitutional invasions of 
owner's right of privacy unless owner consents) . 
89. See United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 472 (8th Cir. 1973) (police procedure 
involved, whether termed inventory or search, definitely substantial invasion of car owner's 
reasonable expectation of privacy). 
90. Cf. Mozzetti , 4 Cal. 3d at 706-07, 484 P.2d at 88-89, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 416-17 
(balancing of governmental interest against onwer's expectation of privacy rebuts justification 
that police search was conducted to protect owner's property); cf. also Reamey, supra note 
17, at 335 (no governmental interest is actually advanced by the justification of protection 
of car owner's property); Comment, supra note 3, at 761 (even if inventory provides greater 
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Despite the holdings in Opperman and Bertine, protection of prop-
erty is not accomplished by making a list of the car's contents,91 
and security may actually be compromised, as it was in Gil/, by 
police entry into protected areas to conduct the inventory. 92 
If the traditional all-inclusive inventory search were discarded 
as a per se method of safeguarding property, less intrusive alter-
natives better suited to individual circumstances might be employed. 
Since a person has a decreased expectation of privacy regarding 
items left in plain view within the car, it would be reasonable for 
police to inventory, and perhaps remove them to prevent theft. 93 
The intrusion would be minimal and its scope related to the need 
justifying it. At the same time, the owner's reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the remainder of the car would be preserved. 94 The 
protection than rolling up windows and locking doors, it means significantly greater intrusion 
upon person's reasonable expectation of privacy within his automobile). 
91 . In Mozzetti, the court called the justification of protection of the owner's property 
"superficial and without substantial merit in an area of constitutional protection." 4 Cal. 
3d at 707, 484 P .2d at 88, 94 Cal. Rptr . at 416. That police may have custody of a vehicle 
does not create a new possessory right in the vehicle's contents to justify a search of the 
vehicle. See id. at __ , 484 P .2d at 91 , 94 Cal. Rptr. at 419; see also State v. Hatfield, 
364 So. 2d 578 , 581 (La. 1978) (police officer stated that inventory search is "a means of 
checking the vehicle without a search warrant") . Contra State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 
__ , 612 P .2d 1311 , 1313 (1980) (inventory searches are valid if they are made to protect 
owner's property); Duncan v. State, 680 S.W.2d 555 , 559 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1984, no pet.) 
(court rationalized propriety of inventory search by stating that once vandal has broken 
door lock, there is little hope that he will be deterred from breaking glove compartment 
lock) . It seems that this justification in Duncan is supportable only if we consider the police 
to be equal in status to vandals . 
92. See Gill, 625 S.W .2d at 319-20. 
93 . See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 474 (8th Cir. 1973) (seizure of 
evidence in plain view not unreasonable under fourth amendment if police are attempting 
to secure car itself). Only the "plain view inventory search" satisfies this standard. See, 
e.g. , Lamb v. State, 561 P .2d 123, 124 (Okla. Crim. App . 1977) (inventory search reasonable 
when evidence seized was in plain view within passenger compartment) . 
94. See, e.g. , Judge v. State, 419 So . 2d 1171, 1172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (since 
primary purpose for inventory search is to secure and protect owner's property, any 
subsequent search must be for "good faith caretaking purpose" and not as guise to conduct 
general exploratory search for incriminating evidence); see also Lawson, 487 F .2d at 471 
(no way to equate police conduct of seizing evidence in plain view with that of breaking 
into locked trunk); State v. Bradshaw, 41 Ohio App. 2d 48, __ , 322 N.E .2d 311, 318 
(1974) (police custody of car, combined with police duty to protect owner's property, permits 
taking reasonable measures to protect car and its contents, but does not permit police to 
conduct full blown investigatory search) . See generally Reamey, supra note 17, at 343 
(inventory search of only items in plain view presents slight intrusion which is logical since 
owner's reasonable expectation of privacy dominates any governmental interest in preventing 
loss of property). 
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Supreme Court has ignored such distinctions, preferring to test 
inventory searches by a standard of applied reasonableness without 
regard for whether the procedure employed was more intrusive than 
other available methods. 95 
B. Protection of the Police from Civil Liability 
It is also questionable whether the police must conduct inven-
tory searches in order to protect themselves from subsequent claims 
concerning lost or stolen property. 96 In inventory situations, police 
are merely involuntary bailees who owe the car owner only a 
minimal duty of care to keep the property in their custody safe. 97 
As such, the police could satisfy their duty of care, and at the same 
time limit their future liability for lost or stolen property, merely 
by rolling up the car windows and locking the doors. 98 
Moreover, inventory no more prevents false claims than it 
protects property. If the property, vehicle, keys and inventory are 
in the possession and control of the police, the listing of items is, 
at best, flimsy evidence that the police acted properly. Actually, an 
95. In Bertine, the Supreme Court continued to reject the argument that police should 
choose the least intrusive procedure when several are available which would serve the 
government's interests. Instead, the Court only considered whether the method chosen by 
the police was reasonable. __ U.S. at __ , 107 S. Ct. at 742-43, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 746-
48. This determination is, of course, made retrospectively, with the Court having full 
knowledge of the contraband or evidence found in the search . 
96. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 379, 96 S. Ct. at 3102, 49 L. Ed. 2d at lOll (Powell, 
J ., concurring) (police inventory searches may not actually be effective means of discouraging 
false claims since car owner may allege item was stolen before inventory or purposely 
omitted from inventory record). Justice Marshall agreed with Justice Powell, questioning 
the effectiveness of inventory searches in reducing police liability. /d. at 391 , 96 S. Ct. at 
3108, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1018 (Marshall, J. , dissenting); see also 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 86, 
§ 7.4, at 371-72 (other security measures, less intrusive than an inventory search, will suffice 
to protect police against fraudulent claims of lost or stolen property, especially when the 
car owner has definitely prohibited inventory search of his car); Reamey, supra note 17, at 
338 (increasing security for impounded vehicles would better safeguard items in police actual 
or constructive custody). 
97 . See, e.g., Mozzetti, 4 Cal. 3d at 7(1), 484 P.2d at 89-90, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 417-18 
(police, as involuntary bailees, only owe car owner slight duty of care). Once this standard 
of care is satisfied, civil liability is precluded and the justification for this governmental 
interest is thus eliminated. See id. 
98. See United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 477 (8th Cir. 1973) (it is difficult to 
understand how the property would be better protected by the police breaking into and 
searching a locked trunk rather than by merely rolling up the windows and locking the 
doors) . 
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accurate listing by the police would be much more beneficial to 
claimants who have lost items. It would help establish their claim 
in cases of theft or neglect. As with the "protection" rationale, 
this interest is not one which aids the government. Rather, it is 
likely to provide a benefit, if at all, to the property owner. Benefits 
are usually waivable by the party enjoying them, which in this case 
is the owner, not the government. 
C. Protection of the Police from Danger 
Finally, it has been said that the police must conduct inventory 
searches in order to protect themselves and others from danger. 99 
This justification has been criticized as unrealistic. 100 The safety 
interest, by itself, has never before been accepted by the Supreme 
Court to justify any warrantless search under the fourth amend-
ment. 101 Probable cause or reason to believe a detainee is armed 
and dangerous has always been required. 102 If the police did have 
probable cause to believe a car contained dangerous materials, the 
car could be searched without relying upon inventory search pro-
cedures and without obtaining a warrant. 103 
More to the point, to permit a search of every vehicle on these 
grounds is to assume that impounded vehicles are likely to contain 
dangerous instrumentalities. Allowing the invasion of protected 
areas on mere possibility is closely akin to the blanket issuance of 
general warrants. Also, it indulges the most unlikely contingency 
by accepting that a person would break into a secured vehicle 
99. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 369, 96 S. Ct. at 3097, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1005. 
100. See Note, supra note 18, at 852 (safety justification for inventory search is "at best 
a make-weight argument" since it is difficult to imagine a situation in which failure to 
conduct an inventory search would result in physical harm to police). 
101. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 390 n.8, 96 S. Ct. at 3107 n.8, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1017-
18 n.8 (Marshall, J ., dissenting) (Court has never condoned a search of any home or car 
merely because the police subjectively reason that a vandal may break in and find dangerous 
weapons); accord Texas Developments, supra note 18, at 262 (absent logical argument in 
support of court's stance, exempting inventories from penumbra of fourth amendment is 
"questionable at best"). 
102. See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509, 98 S. Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L. Ed. 
2d 486, 498 (1978) (warrantless search is justified if conducted in response to urgent need 
to preserve life or avoid injury). . 
103. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 86, § 7.4, at 572 (public protection argument seems 
ridiculous since if the police actually had prob;,ble cause to believe dangerous items were in 
a car, these items could be seized without any inventory justification). 
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guarded by employees or agents of the police, find a weapon, and 
use it to harm someone.'04 It is hardly surprising that this concern 
has been taken so lightly. 
V. EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY TO DETERMINE SCOPE 
The foregoing analyses of the Opperman underpinnings do not 
suggest the abolition of inventory, but do highlight the need to 
restrict its use to maintain the balance embodied in reasonableness. 
In permitting the inventory of an unlocked glove compartment, the 
Opperman court did not purport to strike a balance for other 
compartments in other circumstances. Even the decision in Bertine 
stopped short of holding that scope was without limit once im-
poundment was proper .105 In Gill v. State, the Texas Court of 
Criminal Appeals logically applied the learning of Opperman. In 
doing so, it recognized the expectation of privacy as the proper 
yardstick by which to determine the reasonableness of an inventory's 
scope. 106 
First, Gill recognized that removal and inventory of items in 
plain view is appropriate in light of the slight expectation of privacy 
in such objects. 107 Of course, items located in a car's trunk are not 
within plain view and are less likely to be stolen than property 
placed in its interior. 108 In fact, police often take property that has 
104. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Bertine, observed: 
Not only is protecting the police from dangerous instrumentalities an attenuated 
justification for most automobile inventory searches, but opening closed containers 
to inventory the contents can only increase the risk . In the words of the District 
Court in United States v. Cooper, 428 F. Supp. 652, 654-655 (S .D. Ohio 1977): 
'The argument that the search was necessary to avoid a possible booby-trap is ... 
easily refuted . No sane individual inspects for booby-traps by simply opening the 
container. ' 
Bertine, __ U.S . at __ , 107 S. Ct. at 748, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 753 (Marshall, J ., dissenting). 
105. See supra note 29. 
106. Gill v. State, 625 S.W.2d at 320 (varying expectations of privacy in different parts 
of automobile determinative of car owner's right to privacy under fourth amendment). 
107. See id. at 319. 
108. Id.; State v. Houser, 95 Wash . 2d 143, __ , 622 P .2d 1218, 1226 (1980) (property 
locked in automobile trunk is not in any great danger of being stolen; indeed, many cars 
are left unattended on city streets and no unreasonable risk is posed to contents within 
locked trunks); cf. Reamey, supra note 17, at 345 ("Trunks, like glove compartments, are 
seemingly quite secure and require no further intrusion to protect the property contained 
therein as long as the locking device on the trunk is working properly. " ). 
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been inventoried and place it in the car's trunk for safekeeping. 109 
More importantly, Gill recognized that a person has an in-
creased expectation of privacy regarding those items in a . car's 
locked trunk.ll0 Taking this increased expectation of privacy into 
account, any valid inventory search of a locked car trunk would 
have to further some substantial governmental interest in order to 
achieve constitutional reasonableness. 111 In light of the fact that a 
locked compartment concomitantly expresses both a heightened 
expectation of privacy and a diminished need for protection by the 
police, reasonableness would seem to be difficult for the government 
to demonstrate. 112 
Despite the limitations expressed and implied in Gill and dic-
tated by a conscientious balancing of competing interests, the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals has held in Kelley, 113 Stephen, 114 and 
Guillett115 that once the police are justified in conducting an inven-
tory search, they may freely explore both a car's locked trunk and 
109. See Mazzetti, 4 Cal. 3d at 702, 484 P.2d at 85, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 413 (after vehicle 
inventoried, contents discovered were placed in trunk and trunk locked). Additionally, an 
agreement by the State not to introduce into evidence the contents seized from a locked car 
trunk seems to demonstrate the State's awareness that an inventory search was excessive in 
scope . See Pearson v. State, 649 S.W.2d 786, 790 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1983, pet. ref'd) . 
110. Gill, 625 S.W.2d at 319. This increased expectation of privacy was also mentioned 
by Justice Marshall in Opperman . 428 U.S. at 388 n.6, 96 S. Ct. at 3106 n.6, 49 L. Ed. 2d 
at 1016-17 n.6 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (today, people carry their " most personal and 
private papers and effects" in their cars). 
Ill. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 388,69 S. Ct . at 3106,49 L. Ed. 2d at 1016 (Marshall, J . , 
dissenting) (since an automobile search is a substantial invasion of privacy, the importance 
of the interests used to justify the search of private areas of car should be no less than 
those interests required to justify a search of similar scope in a home or office); see also 
Reamey, supra note 17, at 334 (even if inventory search is undertaken as a caretaking 
function, it must still advance some legitimate governmental interest). Only when the car 
owner's reasonable expectation of privacy is exceeded by a substantial governmental interest 
should a locked trunk or glove compartment be subject to an inventory search . Opperman, 
428 U.S. at 388, 96 S. Ct. at 3106, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1016. 
112. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 636 F .2d 1161, 1163 (8th Cir. 1980) (resulting 
police search was unreasonable based on owner's greater expectation of privacy in locked 
trunk of his automobile); Mozzetti v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 699, 706, 484 P .2d 84, 88, 
94 Cal. Rptr. 412, 416 (1971) ("Constitutional rights may not be evaded through the route 
of finely honed but nonsubstantive distinctions"); State v. }Iouser, 95 Wash . 2d 143, 
--· 622 P.2d 1218, 1226 (1980) (any purported justification of protection of property in 
locked car trunk is outweighed by car owner 's expectation of privacy for property in locked 
car trunk). 
113 . Kelley v. State, 677 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 
114. Stephen v. State, 677 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. ~p. 1984). 
115 . Guillet! v. State, 677 S.W.2d 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). 
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its locked glove compartment, ll 6 an interpretation that far exceeds 
even the expansive reading given the fourth amendment by the 
Supreme Court in Bertine. It is evident that the court of criminal 
appeals has not only departed from its reasoning in Gill, 117 but has 
also divorced itself from established fourth amendment principles 
in an effort to justify these intrusive and once unjustifiable inventory 
searches. 118 
This strained reasoning is seen first in Kelley and Stephen. The 
court concluded that the police, by possessing the key to the car's 
trunk, were exposing themselves to potential liability for lost or 
stolen property and were thus justified in searching the locked trunk 
of the car. 119 This reasoning ignores Justice Teague's observation 
in Gill that since a car's trunk is more secure than its interior, the 
possibility of subsequent claims concerning loss or theft of property 
located within a locked trunk is greatly reduced. 120 Alternatively, 
the officers could have placed the car keys in the police property 
room and insulated themselves even further from subsequent 
claims. 121 And, of course, all of this debate assumes that inventory 
would either protect the police from claims of loss or deter actual 
theft. 
• 
116. Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 37; Stephen, 677 S.W .2d at 44-45; Guil/ett, 677 S.W.2d at 
49. And, of course, Texas is not alone. See, e.g., State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, __ , 
612 P .2d 1311, 1313 (1980) (allowing warrantless inventory of locked trunk) . 
117. See Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 41 (Miller, J ., dissenting) (majority conveniently ignores 
fact that in Gill, main and independent reason for court's decision was that "the inventory 
search doctrine per se does not encompass a locked trunk"); Stephen, 677 S. W.2d at 46 
(Teague, J ., dissenting) (majority authorizes warrantless search of locked trunk which was 
specifically held to be "per se illegal" in Gill); Guillett, 677 S.W.2d at 50 (Teague, J., 
dissenting) (majority opinion demonstrates "total lack of understanding" of what Gill stated 
and held) . 
118. See Kelley, 677 S.W .2d at 41 (Miller , J ., dissenting) (term "inventory search" now 
works to destroy any reasonable expectation of privacy under Texas Constitution); Stephen, 
677 S.W.2d at 46 (Teague, J., dissenting) (although police officer conducted warrantless 
inventory search of locked trunk lacking any probable cause, majority states this type of 
conduct is no longer unreasonable under fourth amendment); Guillett, 677 S.W.2d at 50-51 
(Teague, J ., dissenting) (search conducted is condemned and proscribed by United States 
and Texas constitutions). 
119. Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 37; Stephen, 677 S.W.2d at 44. 
120. 625 S.W.2d at 319. 
121. See Reamey, supra note 17, at 346 (any keys possessed by police should be placed 
in property room, thereby securing locked glove compartment and its contents against 
intrusion by anyone other than police). 
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In Guillett, the court also distinguished Gill because the police 
had the key to the car's locked glove compartment. 122 These opinions 
overlooked the fact that no difference exists between the situation 
in Gill in which the car owner refuses to voluntarily relinquish the 
keys, and the situation in which the police obtain the keys from an 
uncooperative arrestee by search incident to arrest or by inventory 
of personal effects. Kelley, Stephen, and Guillett are not consent 
cases, and the court does not suggest that they are. But in noncon-
sent cases, the police will invariably gain possession of the keys if 
an arrest is made and the car is impounded. By focusing on whether 
the police had the keys, the court has effectively approved the 
inventory of every compartment that can be opened by those keys 
in every impoundment following arrest. Since post-arrest impound-
ment may well be the most common sort, warrantless searches of 
locked compartments unsupported by any level of suspicion may 
now become commonplace in Texas. 
In Guillett, the court secondarily justified the inventory of the 
locked glove compartment as being supported by Opperman. 123 The 
court ignored the important distinguishing fact that in Opperman, 
the police inventoried only the contents of an unlocked, not locked, 
glove compartment. 124 In light of this significant difference, the 
court's reliance on selected portions of Opperman to justify inven-
122. Guillett, 677 S. W.2d at 48. Justice Campbell quotes testimony from Gill that the 
police asked the wrecker driver to remove the back seat because "he knew how" to get into 
the locked trunk . /d. at 49 . What difference the wrecker driver's knowledge makes in the 
illstant case in unclear . An argument could be made that since the police, like the wrecker 
driver in Gill, "knew how" to get into the locked glove compartment (using keys), the 
resulting inventory search, as in Gill, should have been declared unconstitutional. Cf. id. at 
48-49 (court places great emphasis on fact that in Gill Justice Teague supposedly held 
inventory search of locked trunk unconstitutional solely on basis that wrecker driver, and 
DOt police, "knew how" to enter locked trunk). The Guillett court, however , supported this 
tenuous distinction merely by placing undue emphasis on isolated language from the opinion 
in Gill. See id. at 48 (majority quotes from Gill opinion wherein Justice Teague stated that 
"under the facts presented," inventory search of locked trunk was unreasonable); cf. 
Reamey, supra note 17, at 346 n. IOO (speculation whether police could inventory locked 
trunk if they had key is "unsupported by reason or logic" due to clear language in Gill 
that inventory search of locked trunk is "per se illegal"). 
123. See Guillett , 677 S.W.2d at 49, where the court concluded that "facts in the instant 
cue are much like those" in Opperman. The court went on to briefly discuss the facts in 
Opperman and found it immaterial that in the instant case the glove compartment was 
locked while the glove compartment in Opperman was unlocked . /d. 
124. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 380 n.6, 96 S. Ct. at 3102 n.6, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1011 n .t: 
(Powell, J ., concurring). 
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tory of a locked glove compartment is at least suspect and almost 
certainly misplaced. 125 
Colorado v. Bertine126 provides no substantial additional sup-
port for the Texas position on inventory. While the Bertine decision 
certainly expanded the permissible scope of passenger compartment 
inventory searches to include luggage-type containers, it did not 
address the unique privacy expectation represented by a locked 
compartment. Protection of the owner's property, the only signifi-
cant interest advanced by inventory, 127 is satisfied by the lock on 
the compartment unless the owner requests additional protection. 128 
The most disturbing and important point is that all three of 
the Texas cases have jettisoned sound constitutional principles in 
order to support the expansive scope of these inventory searches. 129 
It is settled that inventory is an administrative procedure and is not 
intended to uncover evidence of crime.l3° In Gill, the court specif-
ically noted that the police, while conducting an inventory search, 
do nothing more than take stock of those items found in plain view 
or in unlocked compartments within the car .131 Moreover, the in-
ventory must be conducted pursuant to a standard policy of the 
agency impounding the vehicle. 132 As is true of other procedures 
125. See Reamey, supra note 17, at 346 (why should police possession of keys to locked 
trunk or glove compartment matter with respect to any Opperman justification?); cf 2 W. 
LAFAVE, supra note 86, § 7.4, at 579 (that Opperman allowed opening of unlocked glove 
compartment should not be taken as sign that police may also search locked trunks). 
126. __ U.S. __ , 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed . 2d 739 (1987) . 
127. !d. at __ , 107 S. Ct. at 748, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 753 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("only 
the government's interest in protecting the owner's property actually justifies an inventory 
search of an impounded vehicle"). Neither Opperman nor Bertine demonstrated any logically 
compelling reason to premise inventory on protection from false claims or safety concerns. 
!d. 
128. When the vehicle is locked while impounded, "[t]he owner would then enjoy the 
protection of not only the devices provided by the vehicle manufacturer, but also the security 
afforded by whatever measures are employed by the storage lot to safeguard vehicles." 
Reamey, supra note 17, at 336. The dissent in Bertine argued that the property protection 
interest could have been satisfied by permitting the owner, who was present on the scene, 
to make alternative arrangements for the storage of the vehicle and its contents. __ U.S. 
at __ , 107 S. Ct. at 748, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 754 (Marshall, J ., dissenting). 
129. Kelley, 677 S.W.2d at 41 (Miller, J., dissenting); Stephen , 677 S.W.2d at 46 (Teague, 
J., dissenting); Guillett, 677 S.W.2d at 49-50 (Teague, J ., dissenting). 
130. See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 376, 96 S. Ct. at 3101, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1009 (search 
condoned as non-investigatory) . 
131. 625 S.W.2d at 319. 
132. See Opperman, 428 U.S . at 376, 96 S. Ct. at 3101, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1009; Gill, 625 
S.W.2d at 319. 
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permitting specific police intrusions for a limited purpose, police 
are granted very limited discretion in executing the search, 133 and 
this limitation is an important recognition of the doctrinal proximity 
of such a search to constitutionally-prohibited activity. Therefore, 
to maintain the proper constitutional perspective, the scope of an 
inventory search should coincide with, but never exceed, the degree 
necessary to take stock of items in plain view or in unlocked 
compartments within the car. 134 As a corollary, broadening the scope 
of the inventory search to exceed its limited purposes infringes 
privacy rights without the accompanying safeguards of probable 
cause or warrant that are otherwise constitutionally required. 135 Seen· 
in this light, the balancing of privacy against governmental interests 
is a substitute for the traditional safeguards, and should be under-
taken with the care that characterization demands. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In Gill v. State, 136 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals laid a 
proper foundation for the preservation of a citizen's right to privacy 
in items of personal property in an automobile subject to impound-
ment and inventory. In taking seriously its role as an arbiter of 
reasonableness, the court tacitly, and, at points, expressly, acknowl-
edged that the expectation of privacy is the critical factor to measure 
133 . See Opperman, 428 U.S. at 379-80, 96 S. Ct. at 3102-03 , 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1011-12 
(Powell, J. , concurring) (unrestrained inventory search would be serious intrusion upon 
person' s privacy) . 
134. See, e.g., id. at 383, 96 S. Ct. at 3104, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 1013 (Powell , J ., concurring) 
(officer may not make discretionary determination to extend search simply because certain 
conditions are satisfied); United States v. Wilson, 636 F .2d 1161, 1163 (8th Cir. 1980) 
(legitimate seizure of automobile does not automatically permit police to conduct unlimited 
search of automobile; inventory search must be reasonable in scope); State v. Houser, 95 
Wash. 2d 143, --· 622 P .2d 1218, 1225 (1980). (" The direction and extent of such 
searches must be restricted to effectuating the purposes which justify their exceptions to the 
Fourth Amendment."). 
135 . See, e.g. , United States v. Lawson, 487 F .2d 468, 475 (8th Cir. 1973) (reasonableness 
of search must be evaluated in light of fourth amendment principles, not in light of what 
are to be considered reasonable police procedures); Gonzales v. State, 507 P.2d 1277, 1282 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1973) (if police inventory search is subterfuge, based on suspicion that 
the vehicle may contain contraband, any discovery of such contraband is not admissible 
and " the police inventory void ab initio" ). 
136. 625 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) (on motion for rehearing),I overru/ed on 
other grounds by Osban v. State, No. 368-83 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 1986) (not yet 
reported). 
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against the government's need to inventory. Recognition of 
limiting factor provided a measure of protection against unlimited 
police scrutiny of a vehicle's contents under the guise of inventory 
But by abandoning this limitation in Kel/ey, 131 Stephen, 138 
Guil/ett, 139 the court has skewed the balance. These cases 
much more than the expansion of inventory scope. They mean that 
any expectation of privacy is meaningless in this context. Were that 
expectation replaced by another suitable safeguard, the result might 
be less alarming, but, when one measure is removed from the 
balance without a corresponding adjustment, balancing becomes 
formalistic; the outcom.e is predetermined. 
Has the court really gone so far? If an expectation of privacy 
cannot be held in a locked compartment, the court clearly has 
eviscerated the concept of privacy in the vehicle context. There is 
reason to believe that any expectation of privacy in a vehicle is now 
per se unreasonable in Texas. Orily where the police do not have 
and cannot obtain a key to the compartment will their inventory 
be thwarted. A driver may apparently maintain the security of 
personal effects carried in a vehicle only by locking them in a 
compartment for which he carries no key. Surely this diminution 
of privacy is not warranted by the suspect interests articulated in 
Opperman. 140 
The Supreme Court's decision in Colorado v. Bertine141 will 
undoubtedly be seen by some as vindication of the court of criminal 
appeals' view of the fourth amendment. In actuality, Texas has 
gone much farther than the Supreme Court in sanctioning inventory 
of locked compartments. While Bertine may signal a re~~:ret1tabl~ 
diminution of the role that expectation of privacy is to 
fourth amendment assessments of inventory scope, it is pr(:m~ltW11' 
to interpret the decision as a wholesale abandonment of the COilceJpL; 
Moreover, Texas law need not and should not 
follow the development of fourth amendment jurisprudence.142 
137. Kelley v. State, 677 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. Crim. App . 1984). 
138. Stephen v. State, 677 S.W.2d 42 (Tex. Crim. App . 1984). 
139. Guillett v. State, 677 S.W.2d 46 (Tex . Crim. App . 1984). 
140. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S. Ct. 3092, 49 L. Ed. 2d 
(1976). 
141. __ U.S. __ , 107 S. Ct. 738, 93 L. Ed . 2d 739 (1987). 
142. The Colorado Supreme Court, for example, specifically reserved the queatiOD 
whether the search in Bertine violated article II, section 7 of the Colorado Corastilldllll 
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court of criminal appeals and the courts of appeals have previously 
declined to interpret article I, section 9 of the Texas Constitution143 
as coextensive with the federal constitution, reaffirming the contin-
uing vitality of the Texas exclusionary rule and a body of search 
and seizure law antedating many analogous interpretations of the 
fourth amendment. 144 
No impediment exists, under either a fourth amendment analysis 
or an interpretation of the Texas Constitution, to reaffirmation of 
the balancing undertaken in Gill. Noble motivations cannot and 
should not protect illogic from criticism. Indeed, illogic undermines 
the persuasiveness of legal precedent while, at the same time, often 
imperiling fundamental and well-developed safeguards against im-
proper governmental intrusion. 145 If the United States Supreme 
Court has indulged the government's desire to facilitate the finding 
of criminal evidence at the expense of personal liberty, the court 
of criminal appeals need not follow, nor set, the example. 
It has been said that the word "automobile" is not a talisman 
before which the fourth amendment fades away and disappears. 146 
This sentiment has been echoed in Texas. 147 It now appears, how-
ever, that the word "inventory" has become such a talisman. 148 
See People v. Bertine, 706 P .2d 411, 419 (Colo . 1985), rev'd, __ U.S. __ , 107 S. Ct. 
738, 93 L. Ed . 2d 739 (1987) . 
143 . TEx. CoNST. art. I, § 9. 
144. See, e.g., Howard v. State, 617 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979); Hill v. 
State, 643 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. App .-Houston [14th Dist.]) , aff'd, 641 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 
Crim. App . 1982); Garza v. State, 678 S.W.2d 183, 189-90 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1984, 
pet . granted) . Writing to urge this very kind of independent analysis, Justice Miller of the 
court of criminal appeals recently noted that 
we have and we pride ourselves in having our own concepts of what our Consti-
tution means to us . To willingly vest interpretation of any part of our Constitution 
in a court composed of justices who are neither elected by the people of Texas 
nor necessarily nominated for office by a president the people of Texas elected, 
and who certainly are not accountable to the people of Texas, is a genuine travesty 
of Texas justice. 
Osban v. State, No. 368-83, slip op . at 2 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 1986) (Miller, J ., 
dissenting) . 
· 145 . For a development of this theme in a different context, see Saltzburg, Another 
Victim of Illegal Narcotics: The Fourth Amendment (As Illustrated by the Open Fields 
Doctrine), 48 U. PITT. L. REv. 1 (1986). 
146. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62, 91 S. Ct. 2022, 2035-36, 29 L. 
Ed. 2d 564, 579-80 (1971). 
147. See Gill, 625 S.W.2d at 319 (citing Coolidge). 
148. Bertine, __ U.S. at __ , 107 S. Ct. at 749-50, 93 L. Ed. 2d at 756 (Marshall , 
J . , dissenting). 
